Recent Developments: Dickerson v. United States: The Supreme Court\u27s Holding in Miranda v. Arizona Was a Constitutional Decision That Cannot Be Overruled by an Act of Congress by Mason, Christopher M.
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 31
Number 1 Summer/Fall 2000 Article 9
2000
Recent Developments: Dickerson v. United States:
The Supreme Court's Holding in Miranda v.
Arizona Was a Constitutional Decision That
Cannot Be Overruled by an Act of Congress
Christopher M. Mason
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please
contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mason, Christopher M. (2000) "Recent Developments: Dickerson v. United States: The Supreme Court's Holding in Miranda v.
Arizona Was a Constitutional Decision That Cannot Be Overruled by an Act of Congress," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 31 :
No. 1 , Article 9.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol31/iss1/9
Recent Developments 
Dickerson v. United States: 
The Supreme Court's Holding in Miranda v. Arizona Was a Constitutional Decision 
That Cannot be Overruled by an Act of Congress 
I n a 7-2 decision authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the 
Supreme Court held in Dickerson 
v. United States, that its decision 
in Miranda v.Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), was a constitutional 
decision. 530 U.S. 428, 120 S. Ct. 
2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000). 
Accordingly, the warnings 
promulgated by the Court in 
Miranda, along with the rules set 
forth by the Court in its progeny, are 
the lone factors to be considered 
when determining whether a 
statement made during custodial 
interrogation is admissible in either 
a federal or state trial. 
Consequently, Congress's attempt in 
1968 to legislatively supersede 
Miranda by adopting 18 U.S.C., 
section 3501 ("section 3501") was 
improper. 
Petitioner Charles Dickerson 
("Dickerson") was indicted for 
bank robbery and other related 
crimes in violation of specific 
provisions ofTitle 18 of the United 
States Code. Prior to trial, 
Dickerson moved to suppress a 
statement he had made to FBI 
agents. Dickerson claimed the 
agents had not read him his Miranda 
rights prior to beginning their 
interrogation. The district court 
granted Dickerson's motion and 
suppressed the statement. The 
Government took an interlocutory 
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appeal to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, 
which reversed the district court's 
suppression order by a divided 
vote. While the court of appeals 
agreed that no Miranda warnings 
were given, it concluded that the 
provisions set forth in section 3501 
were satisfied, and, therefore, 
Dickerson's statement was 
admissible in the government's 
case-in-chief. Additionally, the 
court held that the majority opinion 
in Miranda was not a constitutional 
decision, and therefore could be 
overruled by a congressional 
enactment, namely section 3501. 
The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to review the lower 
court's decision. 
In rendering its decision, the 
Court began with a brief synopsis 
of how the law governing 
confessions has developed in this 
country. Id. at 2330. Initially, 
confessions were evaluated under 
a voluntariness test developed at 
common law, with the Court, over 
time, recognizing two constitutional 
bases for this voluntariness 
requirement: the Fifth Amendment 
protection against self-incrimination 
and the Due Process Clause of the 
FourteenthAmendment. Id. Astime 
passed, the Court began scrutinizing 
a defendant's confession under a 
totality of the circumstances 
approach based almost exclusively on 
the notions of due process. !d. at 
2330-31. Finally, in 1966, the Court 
promulgated "concrete constitutional 
guidelines for law enforcement 
agencies and courts to follow," in its 
historic Miranda decision. Id. at 
2331 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966)). 
However, two years later, 
presumably as a result of its 
disagreement with the stringent 
guidelines announced in the 
Miranda holding, Congress 
enacted section 3501, which 
allowed for the admissibility of a 
statement to be once again 
measured solely by its 
voluntariness through a totality of 
the circumstances approach. !d. at 
2331-32. 
Due to the obvious conflict 
between the Court's Miranda 
holding and section 3 501, the Court 
determined that in order to reach a 
decision in the case at bar it must 
first focus on "whether Congress 
has constitutional authority to 
supersede Miranda." Id. The 
Court began its analysis by stating 
that it can prescribe rules of 
evidence and procedure that are 
binding on the federal courts as part 
of its supervisory authority over 
those tribunals. !d. (citing Carlisle 
v. United States, 517 U.S. 416,426 
(1996)). However, whether the 
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Supreme Court has the ultimate 
power to formulate these rules of 
procedure and evidence is 
dependent upon the very rules that are 
being prescribed. !d. at 2332-2333. 
The Supreme Court can only 
create nonconstitutional rules of 
procedure and evidence in the 
absence of a relevant Act of 
Congress. !d. at 2332 (citing 
Palmero v. United States, 360 U.S. 
343, 353 (1959)). Conversely, 
Congress may not legislatively 
supersede a Supreme Court 
decision interpreting and applying 
the Constitution. !d. Therefore, this 
case "turns on whether the Miranda 
Court announced a constitutional rule 
or merely exercised its supervisory 
authority to regulate evidence in the 
absence of congressional direction." 
!d. at 2333. 
In holding that Miranda is a 
constitu,tional decision, the Court 
relied on the fact that Miranda and 
two of its companion cases revolved 
around state, and not federal, court 
proceedings. !d. This is an 
important distinction because the 
Supreme Court does not hold 
supervisory power over state 
courts, as it does the federal court. 
!d. (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 
U.S. 209 (1982)). Therefore, when 
state court proceedings are 
involved, the Court's authority is 
'"limited to enforcing the commands 
of the United States Constitution."' 
!d. (quoting Mu 'Min v. Virginia, 
500 u.s. 415, 422 (1991)). 
Accordingly, Miranda s application 
to the states signifies that the 
enforcement of constitutional 
provisions was the basis for the 
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Next, the Court examined the 
language of the Miranda opinion 
itself, which is "replete with 
statements indicating that the 
majority thought it was announcing 
a constitutional rule." !d. at 2334. 
In fact, this Court pointed to the 
beginning of the Miranda opinion 
itself which states "that the Court 
granted certiorari ' ... to give 
constitutional guidelines for law 
enforcement agencies and courts to 
follow."' !d. at 2333-2334 (quoting 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
441-442 (1966)). 
Furthermore, the Supreme 
Court opined that the "Miranda 
Court's invitation for legislative action 
to protect the constitutional right 
against coerced self-incrimination" 
also supports the conclusion that 
Miranda is a constitutionally based 
decision. !d. at 2334. According to 
the Miranda Court, legislative 
enactments that differ "from the 
prescribed Miranda warnings" are 
not precluded as long as they mirror 
those warnings. !d. The Dickerson 
Court, however, held that section 
3501 is not an adequate substitute. 
!d. at 2335-2336. The Court 
concluded that section 3 501 's return 
to the totality of the circumstances 
approach "cannot be sustained if 
Miranda is to remain law," because 
it creates a "risk of overlooking an 
involuntary custodial confession." !d. 
at 2335 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436,457 (1966)). This is 
a risk the Miranda Court found to 
be "unacceptably great" when the 
government offers the confession in 
its case-in-chief. !d. Additionally, 
the fact that the Court has 
promulgated exceptions to the 
Miranda rule only proves that no 
constitutional rule is absolute. !d. 
at 2335. 
Finally, the Court looked to the 
principles of stare decisis in 
affirming the 1966 Miranda 
decision. !d. at 2336. The Court 
held that this "doctrine carries such 
persuasive force" that it has 
"always required a departure from 
precedent to be supported by some 
'special justification."' !d. (quoting 
Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 
828 ( 1991) (Souter, J., concurring); 
Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 
212 (1984)). In the instant case, the 
Court concluded that there were no 
special justifications to warrant a 
reversal of Miranda. !d. In support 
ofthis conclusion, the Court opined 
that "Miranda has become 
embedded in routine police practice 
to the point where the warnings have 
become part of our national culture." 
!d. Therefore, following the rule 
of stare decisis, the Court declined 
to overrule Miranda, and reversed 
the decision of the Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit. 
The law in Maryland will be 
unaffected by the Court's holding in 
Dickerson. In Ball v. State, the 
Court of Appeals ofMaryland held 
that a confession can only be used 
as evidence at trial against the 
accused where the confession that 
was elicited was in conformance 
with Maryland non-constitutional 
law, the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, Article 22 
of the Maryland Declaration ofRights, 
and the mandates of Miranda. Ball 
v. State, 347 Md. 156, 174, 699 
A.2d 1170 (1997), cert. denied, 522 
U.S. 1082 (1998). Nothing in the 
Supreme Court's opinion in 
Dickerson overrules the precedent 
set forth by the court of appeals in 
Ball. 
In fact, even a decision by the 
Supreme Court that section 3501 
does supersede Miranda most 
likely would not have had a 
significant impact on Maryland law. 
Since section 3501 strictly applies 
to "any criminal prosecution brought 
by the United States or by the 
District of Columbia ... ," Maryland 
would obviously not be bound to 
adhere to section 3501. (emphasis 
added). Consequently, Maryland 
could formulate its own 
voluntariness test, and would most 
likely retain the simplicity of the 
bright-line test created by Miranda 
and adopted in Ball. This result 
seems logical given Maryland's 
more liberal stance regarding the 
protections afforded criminal 
defendants. 
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